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Abstract: This article examines teachers’ unions protest actions under Ghana’s 
Fourth Republic. Situating the analysis within Ghana’s evolving political economy, 
I show how constraints in Ghana’s political economy as well as its often-faltering 
macro-economy have influenced and shaped teachers protest actions as well as 
conditioned governments’ responses to teachers’ unions’ demands.
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Resumo: O presente artigo examina os protestos dos sindicatos de professores 
sob a Quarta República de Gana. Situando a análise dentro da evolução de sua 
economia política, eu mostro como as restrições na política econômica de Gana, 
bem como sua macroeconomia muitas vezes instável, influenciaram e moldaram 
os atos de protestos, assim como condicionou as respostas dos governos às 
demandas dos sindicatos dos professores.
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Resumen: El presente artículo examina las protestas de los sindicatos de 
profesores bajo la Cuarta República de Ghana. Situando el análisis dentro de la 
evolución de su economía política, muestra cómo las restricciones en la política 
económica de Gana, así como su macroeconomía muchas veces inestable, 
influenciaron y moldearon los actos de protestas, así como condicionaron las 
respuestas de los gobiernos a las demandas de los sindicatos de los profesores.
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Gana.
1  Tradução: Luísa de Assis Vieira. E-mail: luisadeassisvieira@gmail.com
DOI: 10.21573/vol34n22018.86364
RBPAE - v. 34, n. 2, p. 349 - 370, mai./ago. 2018350
InTROduCTIOn
 Teaching has been a significant profession and continues to play a crucial 
role in every part of  the world. It has been a critical avenue for social mobility and 
employment for the working class and sometimes middle-class people (Robertson 
2000). Teaching has often taken place within a political and economic context 
where education was considered as a public good and the responsibility of  the 
state until in recent times, when under the sway of  neo-liberal orthodoxies, most 
governments have cut their educational budgets considerably (Compton & Weiner 
2008). Yet, most states strive to maintain a firm grip on the education sector due 
to its potential as a tool for social control and national development. Teachers, 
being key stakeholders in the education area, also seek to advance their interest 
and facilitate their social mobility through the education system. The contribution 
of  teachers towards producing skilled personnel needed for national development 
is acknowledged worldwide. Yet most countries, particularly those in the global 
south, are reluctant to resolve the myriad of  challenges facing teachers and the 
teaching profession (see Sang 2002). Teachers have thus sought to work through 
their unions to limit the effects of  state regulations that limit their pay, job security 
and to shape their conditions in ways that they consider as appropriate. Teacher 
unionism has thus become a tool for teachers to assert themselves in the education 
sector.  
 As elsewhere in the world, Ghanaian teachers are core not only to the 
educational apparatus but also to the political machinery. Their role as professionals 
who inculcate societal norms and values into the future generation of  young 
leaders makes them indispensable to the state. The Ghanaian state regards its 
teachers as agents for social control and national development. However, in 
recent times, developments in the teaching field point to the fact that, while the 
Ghanaian state expects its teachers to work assiduously as its agents, it hardly 
rewards them adequately in terms of  remuneration (see Osei 2006; Amoako-
Gyampah 2015). Even though teachers’ remuneration has improved significantly 
since the 2000s, most teachers continue to complain about the inadequacy of  their 
monthly earnings (Amoako-Gyampah, 2015). Beyond poor remuneration, some 
teachers in Ghana work under stressful conditions. They teach in over-crowded 
classes, teach children under trees, and work in communities that lack access to 
basic social amenities. Even under these difficult conditions, Ghanaian teachers 
are expected to ensure a hundred percent pass rate. They are often accused by 
individuals, parents, communities, and the government of  failing the education 
system. Yet, from the point of  view of  teachers, governments over the years have 
not done enough to improve their conditions of  service. 
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 Subsequently, the prestige that was accorded to teachers in the past is 
fast diminishing as teachers are ranked in the “public eye” as amongst the least 
paid professionals in the country. Teachers in Ghana have organized through 
their unions to protest their deteriorating work conditions and to demand fair 
remuneration and improved conditions of  service. The state, however, seldom 
accede to these demands. Consequently, strikes and protest actions appear to 
have become an annual ritual in the education sector since 1992. This paper 
is a historian’s attempt to contextualize organized teachers’ protest actions, 
grounding the analysis in Ghana’s political economy. I do not pretend to give 
a detailed description of  these protest actions. Instead, I highlight in what ways 
these protests have manifested, what factors have shaped and conditioned 
these protests actions and how those in power have responded. I will limit my 
analysis to the period of  the national democratic Congress (ndC) and new 
Patriotic Party (nPP) administrations spanning 1992/3 to 2008. This allows for 
an examination of  teachers protest actions under the two different governments 
(national democratic Congress, 1992/93-2000 and the new Patriotic Party, 2001-
2008) that have reigned since the inauguration of  the Fourth Republic – thus 
sensitizing us to similar and different conditions under the two governments that 
has precipitated teachers’ protestations as well as the similarity or otherwise of  
responses by these governments to the teachers protests. The paper is structured 
into six sections. The introduction is followed by the context and provenance of  
teacher unionism in Ghana. The next section provides a snapshot of  labor and 
Ghana’s evolving political economy. Section four gives an account of  teachers 
protest actions under the NDC regime and section five brings an account of  
protest actions under the nPP administration. Section six is a conclusion that ties 
up the strands of  arguments from all the sections.
THE COnTEXT And PROVEnAnCE OF TEACHER unIOnISM 
In GHAnA
 Some account of  the development of  teacher unionism in Ghana is 
necessary by way of  preliminary. Currently, there are two major teacher unions 
representing teachers at the pre-tertiary level in Ghana.2 These are the Ghana 
national Association of  Teachers (GnAT) and the national Association of  
Graduate Teachers (nAGRAT). GnAT is the older and the larger amongst the 
teachers’ unions. Teachers were among the earliest groups of  workers in Ghana 
2  Recently, a third teachers’ organisation, the Coalition of  Concerned Teachers Association – Ghana 
(CCTA – GH) has been formed. We wait to see if  this association will survive to be the third labour force in the 
education sector.
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to form associations. Indeed, the formation of  teachers’ associations could 
be traced to the 1920s. The earliest teachers’ association was formed among 
government school teachers around 1926. It was called the Government School 
Teachers Association (GSTA) (see Amoako 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; darkwah 
2014). It is believed that the formation of  this association was sponsored by 
the then colonial director of  Education, J. d. Oman (Amoako 2014a). The aim 
of  the GSTA was to be non-sectarian and non-political and to concentrate on 
improving classroom teaching and related professional issues (darkwah 2014, 
6).  The question of  demanding for improved salaries and related conditions of  
service could not have arisen because, their sponsor, the director of  education – 
being a government representative – could not have organized teachers to make 
demands on the government for improved conditions of  service and increased 
wages for teachers. The GSTA remained dormant throughout the 1930s and was 
revived and renamed the national union of  Teachers (nuT) in the 1940s. As 
darkwah (2014) has suggested, from the point of  view of  modern activism, this 
first teachers’ association could not have been a good pedigree for subsequent 
teachers’ unions.
 The first teachers’ association in Ghana that organized on trade union 
principles emerged in the early 1930s. It was named the Assisted School Teachers 
union (ASTu) because it represented the interest of  teachers who worked in 
assisted schools – that is schools managed by Christian missions with assistance 
in the form of  grants-in-aid from the colonial government (see Amoako 2014a; 
2014b; 2014c). The ASTU was formed in 1932 and was officially inaugurated in 
1933 (see Amoako 2014a). Its formation was prompted by a cut in government’s 
expenditure on education. The cut affected mission school teachers the most as 
the grant given to their missions was reduced by 25 percent. Subsequently, most 
mission school teachers were retrenched and those who were retained had their 
salaries reduced considerably (see Amoako 2014a; darkwah 2014). The ASTu 
thus emerged to protest and reverse the adverse effects of  the government’s 
budget cut on mission school teachers. They adopted what may be described as 
trade union strategies such as protests, petitions, deputations and lobbying of  
the African members of  the Legislative assembly, to fight against the reductions 
(darkwah 2014; Amoako 2014a). Eventually, the ASTu succeeded in persuading 
the government to withdraw the proposed cut (Amoako 2012, p. 50). In 1937 the 
ASTu was renamed the Gold Coast Teachers’ union of  (GCTu) – this name 
change was necessary to shun it of  its sectarian character and to open its doors to 
teachers of  all shades.   
 By the 1950s, several teacher organizations had been formed in 
addition to the GCTu and the nuT. Most of  these associations were formed 
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based on church denomination affiliations, subject areas, levels of  educational 
qualification, and the level of  the educational system at which the teachers 
taught (Amoako 2014a; 2014b; 2014c). For example, there were the Catholic, 
Methodist, Presbyterian schools’ teachers’ unions; the African Graduate Teachers 
Association; the Mathematics Teachers Association; and the Training College 
Teachers’ Association (Asiedu-Akrofi 1971, p. 25; Amoako 2014a). Attempts 
at unifying these unions into a common teachers’ organization were frustrated 
by a misunderstanding between the nuT and the GCTu. Their disagreement 
revolved around the question of  organizational strategy and struggle over 
leadership positions – the GCTu favored a teachers’ association that operated as 
a professional union whereas the nuT advocated for a teachers’ organization that 
operated on trade union principles (Amoako 2014a; 2014b; 2014c). Beyond the 
disagreement over organisational strategy, both the GCTu and nuT claimed that 
they were more representative of  teachers in the country and deserved to assume 
leadership role if  they united into a single union.3  It took government intervention 
and the promulgation of  the Industrial Relations Act, 1958, to compel all teacher 
organisations to join other workers in the education sector to form a single union 
– which was named the union of  Teachers and Education Institution Workers 
(UTEIW). This union was inaugurated in December 1958 and was affiliated to 
the umbrella trade union organisation, the Ghana Trade union Congress (GTuC) 
(Amoako 2014a, pp. 68-69). In 1960 the uTEIW changed its name to the union 
of  Teachers and Cultural Services (uTCS) and in 1962 broke off  from the GTuC 
and formed the Ghana national Association of  Teachers.4
 GnAT remained the only union for teachers at the pre-tertiary level 
until the emergence of  a new union – the national Association of  Graduate 
Teachers (nAGRAT) - in the early 1990s. nAGRAT began as a pressure group 
within GNAT until 1998 when it finally broke off  and became the second union 
for teachers in the education sector representing mainly the interest of  graduate 
teachers within the Ghana education service (Amoako 2014b; Amoako-Gyampah 
2015). The reasons for the formation of  the nAGRAT are varied and contested 
(see darkwah 2014). However, the central concern that ignited the formation 
of  the union seemed to have been the perceptions that the GnAT leadership 
was indifferent to the concerns of  its graduate members (Amoako 2014c). For 
example, the graduate teachers could not understand why the GnAT was reluctant 
to lead the demands for graduate teachers to be put on a separate salary scale 
3  For details see Amoako (2014a); darkwah (2014)
4  The reasons for the break away from GTuC have been detailed by Amoako (2014a), 69-70
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which had been recommended by the Gyampo Salary Revision Commission5 (see 
darkwah 2014). Whatever the reasons that caused the graduate teachers to break 
off  from GnAT; nAGRAT has become one of  the key actors in the education 
labour terrain. Having provided this brief  account of  teacher unionism in Ghana, 
it is imperative that we look at labour and Ghana’s evolving political economy. 
This will provide a broad context for our subsequent discussion of  teachers’ 
grievances and protest actions.   The next section therefore provides a snapshot 
of  Labour and Ghana’s political economy from the 1950s.
LABOuR And GHAnA’S EVOLVInG POLITICAL ECOnOMY
 Since independence in 1957, Ghana has witnessed nine changes in 
government, including four military coups. The last coup brought into power Jerry 
John Rawlings who remained in office as a military dictator until 7 January1993 when 
the fourth republic was inaugurated and continued thereafter as a constitutionally 
elected President until 2000 when his party, the national democratic Congress 
(ndC) lost power to the opposition new Patriotic Party (nPP) which was led by 
John Agyekum Kufour. For most part of  Ghana’s post-colonial political history, 
to borrow the words of  Jeon (1998) “Economic mismanagement has been the 
most common source of  dissatisfaction. Problems with distribution of  resources 
among interest groups, along with economic stagnation, often created conditions 
for political protest” (p. 218). Organised labour has in most instances been 
very active in such political protests. Adu-Amankwah and Tutu (1997, p. 207) 
have observed that government’s economic policies spanning the period after 
independence have had different implications for labour and have contributed to 
shaping labour relations as well as government-trade union relationship.
 Indeed, political discontent following poor economic performance of  the 
nkrumah6 led Convention People’s Party (CPP) government led to the first coup 
in the country in 1966. Even though, the trade union movement was closely allied 
to the CPP government, there were often sporadic workers strikes in response to 
the CPP government’s dismal economic performance, some of  which became 
national in outlook involving most public sector workers (see Jefferies 1978; Kraus 
1979). There is no doubt that workers agitation added to the unpopularity of  
nkrumah’s government and its eventual overthrow. Similarly, popular opposition 
5  The government of  Ghana having identified problems with the public sector pay structure 
constituted the Gyampo Salary Review Commission to study the placement and salary structure of  the sector. 
The commission recommended that graduate professional and graduate non-professional teachers should be 
put on a separate hierarchical structure for salary purposes (daily Graphic Report of  the Gyampo Salary Review 
Commission, 11 May 1994, 6.)
6  Kwame Nkrumah was the first President of  Ghana.
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to devaluation amidst economic decline led by workers partly triggered the coup 
that overthrew Busia’s government in 1972 (Kraus 2008; Jefferies 1982). The 
national Redemption Council (nRC) and the Supreme Military Council (SMC 
I&II), the regime that was established following Busia’s overthrow was kicked 
out of  power because of  poor economic performance and high levels of  official 
corruption. The coup that brought Rawlings to power was staged on the heels of  
political chaos brought about partly by convulsive workers’ strikes following the 
failure of  the Limann-led People’s national Party (PnP) government to arrest 
Ghana’s economic decline (see Jeon 1998, p. 220). 
 Ghana’s dismal economic performance and unstable growth since 
independence coupled with persistent economic decline in the 1970s and the 
inability of  the Rawlings-led regime to resolve Ghana’s economic problems 
with a home-grown policy led to the adoption of  the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s tailored structural adjustment policies in the 
early 1980s. With the implementation of  the adjustment policies, albeit austere, 
Ghana began to experience moderate and sustained economic growth after 1985, 
experiencing higher growth rates in the 2000s (Lindsay 2011; Aryeetey & Kanbur 
2008). In spite of  this modest growth, the country could not progress very much. 
Ghana continued to rely on its traditional export commodities - gold and cocoa 
(see Aryeetey & Kanbur 2008; Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar, 2010). Indeed, at the 
beginning of  the 1990s, cocoa contributed 50 to 60 percent of  export revenue, 
about 20 percent of  government revenue and about 7 percent to GnP. This 
trend would continue into the 2000s as growth during the first half  of  the 2000s 
was largely driven by performance of  gold and cocoa exports – indeed Ghana 
benefited from the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire   and the consequent increase in 
the world price of  cocoa (Lindsay 2011a, p. 7; Lindsay 2011b, p. 13). Again, the 
huge inflow of  foreign aid as a major source of  investment during the period 
of  adjustment made Ghana’s growth efforts unsustainable as a reduction in aid 
inflow in the 1990s jeopardized Ghana’s economy (Killick 2000).
 Ghana’s macro-economy in the 1990s was marked with instability. 
This was due largely to government’s profligate spending, and fluctuations in 
international commodity prices. The problem worsened as the IMF suspended 
its concessional credit flows under its lending agreement with the country as 
punishment for the NDC government’s loss of  fiscal discipline (Lindsay 2011b). 
Apart from having to service debts accruing from inefficiently managed state-
owned enterprises, the government was hardly able to generate anticipated 
revenue due to policy reversals. Beyond this the government engaged in ‘politically 
motivated’ expenditure in the run-off  to the 1992 and 1996 elections – providing 
unbudgeted for rural infrastructure and increasing public sector wages to win 
RBPAE - v. 34, n. 2, p. 349 - 370, mai./ago. 2018356
rural and urban votes respectively (Lindsay 2011b, p. 16). After the 1992 elections, 
however, the NDC government was willing to take harsh measures to fix the fiscal 
imbalances that had resulted from their reckless politically motivated spending. 
Haynes (1995) observed that “after the elections, the government wanted to 
show to the World Bank that its capitulation to the civil servants was merely a 
tactic to help it gain electoral successes” (p. 113). Subsequently, the last PndC 
budget announced on 5 January 1993, two days preceding the inauguration of  the 
Fourth Republic, was nothing less than austere. A sixty percent increase in the 
price of  petrol affected all sectors of  the economy raising the prices of  goods 
and services astronomically – in some cases by as much as 100 percent (Jeon 
1998, p. 223; Haynes 1995). Operating within the constraints of  IMF and World 
Bank conditionality, the ndC government was forced to cut down on public 
expenditure drastically after 1993. To make matters worse, inflation soured up 
precipitously and the cedi continued its sharp devaluation (Haynes 1995, p. 110). 
Indeed, by December 1995, inflation stood at 70.8 percent (Jeon 1998, p.223). 
Around this same period, the cedi had suffered about a 218-fold reduction in its 
value vis-à-vis the u.S dollar since 1983 (Haynes 1995, 110).  With such menacingly 
deteriorating economy and its impact on labor, workers’ organizations were less 
likely to act with equanimity. 
 According to Haynes (1995), ‘the first year of  the Fourth Republic’ was 
characterized with labor agitations and strikes because of  the inflationary impact 
that followed the increased price of  petrol and the ‘inadequate wage levels of  
ordinary workers in Ghana’ (p. 110). Indeed, one could say that workers were 
probably reacting to long-standing neglect and continuing impoverishment since 
the implementation of  the structural adjustment policies in the 1980s. The PndC 
government’s ability to use repressive measures to counteract social unrest had 
ensured that workers had acquiesced to its austere economic measures and its 
impact on their wages and living conditions following the implementation of  the 
adjustment policies in the 1980s (see Herbst 1993; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-
Johnson 1993). Indeed, between 1986 and 1990, the minimum wage had lost 
about 20 per cent of  its value; there was a further dip of  13 per cent between 1991 
and 1993 (Haynes 1995, p. 111) and by the end of  1994, the monthly wages of  
public sector workers had decreased by 22 per cent – the highest in the first four 
years after transition (Hutchful 2002, pp. 90-91; Amoako 2014c, p. 19). 
 As the macro-economy continued to falter, so did workers conditions 
continue to deteriorate. By the time the ndC handed over power to the nPP in 
January 2001, Ghana’s economic situation was dire, and workers were nothing 
less than impoverished. Macroeconomic indicators were faltering, and Ghana’s 
treasury was burdened with huge debt, both foreign and local (Lindsay 2011b). 
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John Agyekum Kufour of  the new Patriotic Party, who assumed power in 
January 2001, in his maiden State of  the nation address   painted a gloomy 
picture of  the economy lamenting that it was characterised by mismanagement, 
huge unemployment, low wages increasing cost of  living, huge national debt, 
high dependency on foreign aid, deteriorating health and educational facilities, 
unproductive private sector and massive corruption (Republic of  Ghana, 2001. p. 
2; Amoako-Gyampah, 2015, p. 66).
 To solve the economic challenges, the nPP government, among other 
measures, reluctantly adopted the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative 
in 2001. The reprieve gained enabled the government to stabilize the macro-
economy, create a business-friendly environment (see Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 
2010; Killick 2010; Amoako-Gyampah 2015) and introduced some significant 
social intervention measures. Between 2002 and 2005, the government’s fiscal 
discipline – ‘tighter control over spending, with strict cash limits on spending 
ministries’ (Killick 2010, p. 415), helped to reduce Ghana’s budget deficit and 
the rate of  monetary expansion. Killick (2010, p. 415) estimates that monetary 
growth was reduced from 50 percent in 2002 to 14 percent in 2005, and the 
inflation rate was brought down to a single digit in the early months of  2006. 
Similarly, the ever-pervading depreciation of  the cedi was for a while arrested. 
Other sectors of  the economy put a strong showing compelling the World Bank 
to comment that Ghana was “in the middle of  acceleration of  economic growth” 
(quoted in Killick 2010, p. 415).   
 I should remark, however, that in spite of  the strong prospects at economic 
growth, the nPP government hardly lived up to its economic goals. Lindsay 
(2011b) has observed that due to the nPP government’s misplaced economic 
planning after 2004, by January 2009, the country had plunged into financial crises 
- budget deficit had soured up to 14.5 per cent of  GDP, currency depreciation 
resurged, and inflationary tendencies bounced back - indeed, while inflation 
remained moderate until 2007, by 2008, it almost doubled to 20 per cent (Killick 
2010, p. 417). Lindsay (2011b) further observed that while it is true that the nPP 
government had to deal with oil prices that steadily increased during its tenure, 
the gradual economic crises that peaked in 2009 did not cause the government to 
re-examine its economic policies nor to create new sources of  foreign exchange 
to offset the emerging economic problems. The nPP government was, similarly, 
trapped in the election based spurt of  spending. While the nPP government 
could avoid election-related spending in 2004 because it was sufficiently sure of  
victory, “the 2008 election demonstrated that an nPP government was willing to 
use its spending powers for electoral gain when it was less sure of  voters’ verdict” 
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(Killick 2010, p. 415). The impact of  such reckless politically-motivated spending 
on Ghana’s economy was telling.7 Thus, when the NPP government left office in 
2009, the economy was little improved but equally as bankrupt as when they took 
over in 2001 (Lindsay 2011b, p. 25)
 However, despite the economic difficulties, it would seem that the earlier 
respite gained from the HIPC initiative enabled the nPP government to commit 
to some appreciable level of  social spending including increases in workers’ 
salaries. Workers’ salaries were improved substantially – indeed, in 2002, both the 
lowest and highest real wages of  workers rose to 11.6 percent and 12.9 percent 
respectively. Similarly, in 2003 the lowest and highest real wages increased by 22.5 
percent and 34.9 percent. In 2005 real wages increased by more than 28 percent 
(Bank of  Ghana 2007, p. 8; Amoako-Gyampah 2015, p. 67).  notwithstanding 
these increases in salaries, however, the nPP government, just like its predecessor 
ndC administration, also had to contend with labor unrest, especially after 2004. 
Workers protested and embarked on sporadic strike actions to demand further 
improvements in salaries and improved conditions of  work. Elsewhere I have 
argued that even the so-called macroeconomic gains that the nPP government 
was able to achieve appeared superficial and did not practically reflect in workers’ 
living and working conditions (see Amoako-Gyampah, 2015). 
 The government’s decision after 2004 to discontinue with the payment 
of  subsidies on petroleum products and the subsequent pass-through of  the 
changes in the cedi value of  the international costs of  petroleum and petroleum 
products to Ghanaian consumers coupled with astronomical increases in utility 
tariffs (Gocking 2005; Amoako 2015) seemed to have undermined the relief  
offered by the upward adjustments in workers ‘salaries. As would be expected 
such developments were not received calmly by the working population – as the 
labor front saw several wild-cat strikes and stoppages (see Amoako-Gyampah 
2015). Gocking (2005) has suggested that workers hardly benefitted from the 
so-called economic successes of  the nPP administration acclaimed by the donor 
agencies. Consequently, after 2004 the government was under pressure to deal 
with the wanton budgetary excesses arising from the huge public sector wage 
bill. (Centre for Economic Policy Analysis, 2009; Amoako-Gyampah 2015). The 
government was thus unwilling to readily yield to workers’ demands for increases 
in their salaries in the years after 2004 – the result of  which was acute labor unrest 
(see Amoako-Gyampah 2015). The government was constrained in caving in to 
7  For details on election related spending see (Killick 2010, chapter 15)
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the workers’ demands since any substantial wage increases could have aggravated 
the inflationary tendencies in the Ghanaian economy – tendencies that have 
pervaded Ghana’s economic history since the 1960s, albeit with varying impacts.  
 It is my contention that while the opening of  the democratic space with 
the inauguration of  the Fourth Republic seemed to have enabled organized labor 
to operate freely, economic constraints and government’s fiscal policies have 
thwarted their efforts at achieving substantial salary increases and improvements 
in the conditions of  service of  Ghanaian workers. For this reason, there has been 
an adversarial relationship between organized labor and government since 1992. 
Haynes (1995) observed that many, of  Ghana’s politically conscious unionized 
workers believed that the government wilfully denied workers substantial raises 
in the real value of  the minimum wage. If  this workers’ sentiment was true 
for the ndC administration, the same could be said during the tenure of  the 
nPP administration. We can surmise then that under Ghana’s Fourth Republic 
economic considerations more than anything else seemed to have been critical to 
popular discontent and protest actions. Teachers’ agitations and protest actions 
under the Fourth Republic have thus being influenced and conditioned by the 
broader political economy – they just like other public-sector workers have reacted 
to the ebbs and flow of  governments’ macroeconomic and fiscal policies which 
have negatively impacted on their working and living conditions. In the following 
sections, I discuss teachers’ grievances and protest actions since 1993.8
TEACHERS’ GRIEVAnCES undER THE ndC (1993-2000)
 Organised teachers were among the first group of  workers to raise the red 
flag in the early years of  the 1990s when the political environment was relaxed and 
accommodating of  protest actions.9 The GnAT declared a nation-wide strike in 
March 1990. The strike lasted for two weeks and was in demand for improvement 
in basic salaries and allowances; establishment of  a joint negotiation committee 
for regular determination of  salaries and associated benefits; the establishment of  
the Ghana Education Service Council which the PndC regime had abolished in 
8  The following sections borrows liberally from previously published works by the author on this 
subject matter (see Amoako 2014b; Amoako-Gyampah 2015).
9  The PndC government was less accommodating of  protest actions during the 1980s. It used 
repressive measures to supress all forms of  protest actions. However, the early years of  the 1990s, when it 
became obvious that a democratic transition was inevitable, the regime relaxed its repressive measures as one of  
the measures to attract popular support - for it had reinvented itself  and transformed the PndC into ndC – an 
electoral machinery to contest the 1992 elections.
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1982; and the full implementation of  all existing conditions of  service (Ampaw 
1995, p. 29; Amoako 2014c, p. 18). The government promised to resolve the 
grievances and prevailed on the teachers to return to work as it looked for a 
lasting solution (Amoako 2014c). 
 Following the failure of  the PndC regime and the successor ndC 
government to resolve the teachers’ grievances, the GnAT once again declared 
a strike action on 31 May 1994 to put pressure on the government to address 
its long-standing grievances. Apart from the demand for payment of  ex-gratia 
awards to retrenched ‘pupil teachers’ who had served in the Ghana Education 
Service for a period of  five years (see Amoako, 2014c), all the other grievances 
which necessitated the 1994 strike action were concerned that teachers had raised 
since the 1980s which the PndC regime had failed to address (Ampaw 1995, 
pp. 29-30). Apart from this strike action, GnAT again declared a dispute and 
called a six-day strike in 1999 which saw about 50, 000 teachers down their tools 
to demand salary increases and payment of  arrears.  In 2000, the nAGRAT also 
declared a strike action which involved 5000 teachers calling on the government 
to put graduate teachers on a separate entry level on the Ghana Education Service 
scale to reflect level 15 of  the Ghana Universal Salary Structure (GUSS) (Amoako 
2014c, p. 23). Implicitly, the graduate teachers were demanding for higher salaries 
since placement at that level on the GuSS meant an automatic increase in their 
salaries. The government resolved this strike and placed the graduate professional 
teachers on level 14 on the GuSS.
 Two analytical points can be advanced to explain why strike actions 
became an important tool for organized teachers in the early years of  the 1990s. 
Firstly, it could be said that it was the PndC/ndC governments’ intransigence 
and its often resort to bureaucratic delay tactics in settling the teachers’ agitations 
that often compelled the GnAT to call its members to resort to strike actions 
(Amoako, 2014b). The events leading to the 1994 strike action, for example, are 
revealing. As early as April 1993, GnAT made arrangements to meet with the 
Minister of  Education, Harry Sawyer to present to him its grievances. GnAT 
followed up this meeting with a memorandum on educational issues which were 
presented to the Minister on 17 May 1993 (GnAT 1993; Amoako, 2014c) This 
memorandum was followed with several other letters stating the grievances of  
teachers and requesting the government to address them (Amoako 2014c). 
 The government failed to respond either verbally or in writing to any of  
these letters and memorandum (Osei-Mensah 1994).  In spite of  this failure on the 
part of  the government, the GnAT continued to look for non-confrontational 
means to get its grievances resolved. It sought for opportunities to hold meetings 
with the Minister for education to present to him to its concerns. For example, 
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between 10 February and 31 May 1994, the GnAT held four different meetings 
with the Education Minister to discuss its grievances. Yet, none of  these meetings 
yielded any positive outcome except that in one of  such meetings, the Minister 
promised to present the GnAT’s grievances to Cabinet for consideration (GnAT 
1994). In another meeting convened on 25th April at the instance of  the Minister, 
following GnAT’s threat to embark on strike action, (Amoako 2014c, p. 21), 
the Minister promised to resolve all of  GnAT’s concerns. He subsequently gave 
definitive indications on how he was proceeding in resolving the grievances of  the 
teachers (Amoako 2014, p. 21). Yet when on the 31st of  May 1994, the GnAT 
met the Minister for briefing, it became clear to the GNAT leadership that the 
Minister had adopted a bureaucratic maze to frustrate their attempts at getting 
their grievances resolved – for the minister had done little or nothing concrete 
to assure GnAT of  his commitment to resolving their grievances (Osei-Mensah 
1994, p. 13). It was because of  this that GnAT called its members to embark on 
strike action on 31 May 1994 (see Seini 1994, p. 9). It is thus clear that while the 
GnAT had remained extremely conciliatory in getting its grievances resolved, the 
government and its functionaries were rather tardy and appeared to be negotiating 
in bad faith. It would thus seem that if  the government had been a little proactive 
in resolving the teachers’ grievances these strike actions could have been avoided. 
 Secondly, it would appear that the teachers’ grievances just like the 
grievances of  other public-sector workers were driven by their ever-deteriorating 
economic conditions which pushed them to demand increased salaries and 
improved conditions of  service to ease their impoverishment. Indeed, in spite 
of  the modest attempts at transforming Ghana’s economy since the 1980s, 
the liberalization policies adopted by the P/ndC government following the 
implementation of  the economic recovery and adjustment programmes greatly 
disadvantaged the working population. The need to limit pay increases in keeping 
with the adjustment policies (see nugent 1995, p. 169) had led to a situation 
where, by 1995, real wages of  public sector workers had fallen to the extent that 
it was half  of  what it had been in 197010  (see Overa 2007, p. 541). As Hansen 
(2003) has rightly observed, adjustment policies, in spite of  its glorification by 
Western donors and their allied institutions, did thrust Ghanaian formal sector 
employees into the throes of  economic hardship. The removal of  subsidies on 
petroleum products and electrification tariffs even as the government remained 
constrained to cushion public sector workers with salary increases (as measures to 
stabilize the economy) impoverished the working population. 
10  Teachers were on the same salary scale as other public sector employees.
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 It was the result of  the difficult economic situation in which the average 
Ghanaian workers found themselves that between 1991 and 1995, the Consultative 
Forum of  Labour which included GnAT, the Civil Servants Association (CCSA), 
Ghana Association of  Registered nurses (GRnA), and the Judicial Service 
Association (JuSAC) were engaged in a bitter struggle with government over 
higher salaries and better conditions of  service. The reluctance of  government 
to concede to demands for by the Forum and give to workers any appreciable 
income raises would result in sporadic strike actions which saw nurses down their 
tools in May/June 1992; and this was followed by other civil servants during 
the first two weeks of  July the same year (Ampaw 1995, pp. 29-30). Following 
the announcement of  the austere budget of  the 1993 fiscal year, the Forum 
demanded an increase of  60 per cent in their income in order to recoup the loss 
in real income caused by the price hikes and the associated inflationary pressures 
– this, the regime was reluctant to accede to (Ampaw 1995, p. 29). The result was 
massive demonstrations and threats of  strike actions throughout 1993 with spill-
overs in the following years. As Kumado and Gockel (2006) observed:
The inadequacy of  incomes was compounded by intractable high rates of  inflation 
and exchange rate depreciation so that those on fixed incomes particularly 
pensioners have become worse off. For example, although inflation was brought 
down from its highest ever level of  123% in 1983 to 10% by end of  1992, it 
nevertheless remained intractable. Indeed, inflation, coupled with the steady 
decline of  the cedi/dollar rate, which reverberates through the economy, has ever 
since been the bane of  workers (p. 3).
 Thus, we can surmise that the root cause of  this government-labor 
impasse of  which GnAT’s agitation was part was over the question of  wages and 
salaries – essentially, a fight to improve the material benefits of  teachers. It thus 
appears from the foregoing analysis that the effects of  Ghana’s macroeconomic 
constraints in part fuelled the teachers’ agitations and that government’s tardiness 
in resolving these grievances then resulted in the often-sporadic strike actions 
which became a characteristic feature in the education labor arena during the 
period.
THE nPP REGIME: nEW VISTAS FOR TEACHERS?
 After two successive terms of  ndC rule under the leadership of  
Rawlings, the ndC new presidential candidate, Professor John Evans Atta-Mills 
lost the presidential race in a run-off  in december 2000 to John Agyekum Kufour 
of  the nPP. As I have mentioned earlier the nPP government inherited a stressed 
economy. Yet, perhaps owing to the ability of  the new government to articulate 
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clearly the economic position of  the country and its proposed measures to turn 
the economy around, it received a lot of  goodwill from Ghanaians generally 
and the working population in particular. Its efforts at the enactment and the 
promulgation of  a new labor law; Labour Act 651 which had been in the pipeline 
since the 1990s was hailed by organized labor as a landmark in Ghana’s labor history. 
Subsequently, the first term of  the NPP government’s administration witnessed 
fewer labor disputes. That is not to say, however, that there were no tensions at all 
on the labor front. Teachers in particular led by the GnAT threatened to embark 
on a strike action on 1 October 2001 to demand improved conditions of  service 
and the implementation of  supervision allowance.11 Similarly, the nAGRAT 
threatened to withdraw its services beginning from 28 April 2004 in demand 
for higher invigilation allowance. In both instances, the threats were withdrawn 
because according to the teachers the government’s position on their grievances 
sounded reasonable and acceptable (Amoako 2012, p. 95; Amoako 2015).
 This seemingly harmonious industrial relations in the education sector 
will last but only until the end of  2004 – for in 2005 and 200612 the education 
sector witnessed some of  the most prolonged labor disputes in Ghana’s labor 
history. Interestingly, nAGRAT was at the forefront of  these agitations. That is 
not to say that the issues over which nAGRAT declared strike actions concerned 
only graduate teachers – the issues affected non-graduate teachers as well – and 
in fact in 2006, rank-and-file members of  GNAT members declared sporadic 
wild-cat strikes in solidarity with nAGRAT even though the leadership of  
GnAT distanced itself  from the strike action (see Amoako-Gyampah 2015).13 
On 6 May 2005 nAGRAT declared a strike action in protest against government’s 
lackadaisical attitude in resolving their grievances which included: failure of  the 
Ghana Education Service (GES) to address teachers’ demands for increased 
responsibility allowance; the reluctance of  the Ministry of  Education and the 
11  Supervision and invigilation allowances are paid to teachers who take up additional responsibilities 
as invigilators and supervisors for external examinations of  the Ghana Education Service. The Ghana Education 
Service depend on the West African Examination Council (WAEC) to organise the Basic School Certificate 
Examination which qualifies basic students to enter Senior High Schools. At the senior high school level, a 
similar examination, which is the West African Senior School Certificate Examination which is the qualifying 
examination for entry into tertiary institutions is also conducted by the same organisation.
12  For detailed analysis of  these strike actions see Amoako (2015)
13  It would seem that after several years of  operating on the side-lines of  the education labour terrain 
since its registration and inauguration in 2008, the nAGRAT was at this point asserting its presence in the 
education labour arena. Of  course, the formation of  nAGRAT was goaded by the perceptions that GnAT was 
reluctant to pursue the interest of  its graduate membership cohort. Besides, it appeared less likely that with two 
women occupying the most important leadership positions in the GnAT, one could expect any intense agitation 
from the GNAT. In 2002, Irene Duncan Adanusa, the first ever female general secretary of  the GNAT, replace 
Paul Osei Mensah who had served since 1983. The presidential position also fell to Portia Molly Anafo. With 
their motherly instincts and concern for children one could only expect a cautious agitation from GnAT’s front.
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GES to approve and fix dates for promotion of  assistant directors and grades 
above those; the GES’s delay in issuing letters to teachers who had been promoted 
to the grades of  Superintendents and Principal Superintendents; the failure of  the 
GES and the West African Examinations Council (WAEC) to pay full supervision 
allowances due to teachers (Gobah 2005, p. 3; Amoako 2015, p.11). 
 Agitations for most of  these demands had begun since January 2004. 
nAGRAT wrote several letters, presented several memoranda and held several 
meetings with the Ministry of  Education - all in attempt to get these grievances 
resolved; in some instances, there were threats and counter threats from both the 
Ministry of  Education and GES on the one hand and nAGRAT on the other. 
Yet no tacit conclusions were reached – and the resulting frustration prodded 
nAGRAT to resort to strike action as the last option (Amoako 2015, pp 11-13). 
About a month into the strike action, the Education Sub-committee of  Ghana’s 
Parliament offered to broker peace between nAGRAT and the government. The 
Committee succeeded in persuading nAGRAT to return to work as it continued 
with negotiations to find a lasting solution to the dispute. It appeared that once the 
teachers resumed work, little was done to resolve their grievances (see Amoako 
2015). The failure of  the GES and the Ministry of  Education to find a lasting 
solution to the concerns of  the teachers thus underpinned the resort again to 
strike action by nAGRAT in 2006.  
 The 2006 nAGRAT strike begun on 1 September 2006 and continued 
for almost eight weeks. Apart from the demand for the government to implement 
all outstanding grievances on which Memorandum of  understanding had been 
reached (these included, invigilation allowances, payment of  responsibility 
allowances14, issuance of  letters of  conversion to all graduate teachers, irrespective 
of  whether they were professionals or not); nAGRAT also demanded to be 
represented on all GES committees and panels and also on the GES Council 
– which is the governing body of  the education sector and demanded the 
reimbursement of  teachers whose salaries had not been paid since 2003 (Amoako-
Gyampah 2015). Most of  these demands were unresolved grievances from the 
2005 strike that had been restated. The central concern during the 2006 strike, 
however, was the demand for an upward adjustment in salaries. Just like events 
leading to the 2005 strike action, nAGRAT had exhausted both the formal and 
informal channels to get its grievances resolved before it finally decided to embark 
on strike action. Following a threat in March 2006 to embark on a strike action if  
its grievances from 2005 were not resolved, the Minister of  Education, Yaw Osafo 
Marfo, intervened and persuaded the teachers to withdraw their threat, promising 
14  Responsibility allowance is paid to teachers who take up additional responsibilities as head teachers/
head masters, house masters/mistresses (in boarding schools), head of  departments, etc.
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to ensure that the teachers’ grievances would be resolved (nAGRAT 2006; 
Amoako-Gyampah 2015). Interestingly the Minister was removed from office 
before he could see to the execution of  his promise and neither his successor nor 
the GES and the Ministry of  Education took any concrete measures to address 
the concerns of  the teachers. It was this failure on the part of  the education 
authorities that incited nAGRAT to call the strike action.
 It is obvious from the above narration that in both the 2005 and 2006 strike 
actions, it was the government’s laxity in finding lasting solutions to the teachers’ 
grievances that prodded nAGRAT to embark on strike actions. In both instances, 
the teachers used several negotiation channels to seek redress and resorted to 
strike actions only as a last resort (see Amoako-Gyampah 2015). Their grievances 
concerned fundamentally demands improvements in their conditions of  service 
and agitations for salary increases. I must, however, remark that concerning 
salaries, the nPP government increased the salaries of  teachers substantially. 
For example, in 2003 the average basic monthly salary of  the non-professional 
graduate teacher was ¢1,422,836 (equivalent to $160.7).15 The professional 
graduate teacher during the same period earned an average basic monthly salary 
of  ¢1,641,465 (equivalent to $185.4). By 2006, the average basic monthly salary of  
the non-professional graduate teacher had increased to ¢2,400.105 (equivalent to 
$270.4) and that of  the graduate professional to ¢2,877,726 (equivalent to $313.5) 
(Amoako-Gyampah 2015, p. 68). Thus, in a space of  three years, the salaries of  
both professional graduate teachers and non-professional graduate teachers had 
almost doubled. 
 Yet, the demand for salary raises and improvement in related conditions 
of  service became cardinal to teacher agitations in both 2005 and 2006. As I have 
stated earlier, the deregulation of  the oil market and the subsequent burden on 
Ghanaian consumers to pay realistic market prices for petroleum products as well 
as well as an upward adjustment in utility tariffs, and other cost-saving measures 
adopted by the nPP government to stabilise the macro-economy appeared to 
have undermined the salary raises which the government offered to Ghanaian 
workers. Besides the government was under pressure to find ways to minimize the 
public-sector wage bill which had become the bane of  government expenditure, 
and a major contributing factor to budgetary excesses. It was for this latter reason 
15  A maximum of  8 hours a day or 40 hours a week is set for all public sector workers including teachers. 
However, teachers in basic schools maintain 7 hours contact a day with pupils. There is a common contract for 
all public school teachers in Ghana and variations are dependent on levels of  qualification and the duration of  
service. That is the say that teachers are promoted and ranked based on both levels of  qualification and long 
service. Pay levels are thus commensurate with ranks. For example, newly recruited diploma teachers start as 
Senior Superintendent II, Bachelor degree holders are recruited as Senior Superintendents, and subsequent 
promotion to the ranks of  Assistant director, deputy director and director are contingent on long service and 
after having passed a promotion interview.
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that the government adopted a tactical decision to delay salary negotiation and 
wage settlements during the 2005 fiscal year (see Centre for Economic Policy 
Analysis 2009) – a move which saved the country an amount equivalent to 0.4% 
of  GdP. Interestingly, this decision would partly contribute to the labor unrest 
which was witnessed in 2005 and 2006 respectively (see Amoako-Gyampah 
2015). Indeed, one observer declared 2006 as the season of  strikes because of  the 
number of  labor disputes that were recorded – all over wages and improvements 
in conditions of  service (Coleman 2006; Amoako-Gyampah 2015).
COnCLuSIOn
 Teachers’ protest actions under Ghana’s Fourth Republic have manifested 
itself  in the form of  strike actions to demand salary increases and improvements in 
teachers working conditions. However, the teachers’ organizations have resorted 
to strike actions only as a last resort to get their grievances resolved. Often, the 
teachers’ unions have sought to resolve their grievances through the available 
negotiation channels.  However, the various governments, that have ruled since 
the inauguration of  the Fourth Republic, first the NDC and later the NPP have 
both in diverse ways frustrated the teachers’ unions’ efforts and have remained 
tardy – negotiating in bad faith -  in resolving the teachers’ grievances. It thus 
appears that it is the governments’ indifferent attitude towards resolving teachers’ 
grievances that have often pushed the teachers’ unions to declare strike actions. 
These strike actions have however been fuelled by the ebbs and flows of  Ghana’s 
faltering political economy and government’s macroeconomic measures and its 
negative impact on the living and working conditions of  the teaching profession. 
It would seem also that government’s laxity in responding to, and addressing 
the teachers’ grievances timely, has been shaped and conditioned partly by their 
commitment to implementing their economic measures, most of  which have 
been unpopular amongst the working population. Economic constraints have 
thus defined teachers’ agitations as well as conditioned government responses.
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